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-CHAPTER 9 
Security and Mortgages 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
§9.I. Tenancy by the entirety: Surviving tenant's right to contribu-
tion. Those common law forms of co-ownership of land, in which the 
surviving co-tenant takes the entire property, developed in an age when 
land was not usually an article of commerce. In those states in which 
joint tenancies and tenancies by the entireties survive, creditors' rights 
and security interests relating to the land are complicated by the neces-
sity of imposing some logic and uniformity upon the commercial use 
of these estates.1 When land so held is subject to a mortgage the situa-
tion becomes even more complicated when one of the co-tenants dies. 
The mortgage debt, if a joint obligation of both parties, personally 
binds each, and the note both signed will bind the estate of the non-
surviving tenant as well as the survivor. But the land subject to the 
mortgage now becomes totally the property of the survivor, and fore-
closure of the mortgage would affect only his sole interest in the land, 
unless, of course, there was a deficiency. 
When two persons are liable as principals on a debt the general rule 
is that the one who pays the debt is entitled to contribution from his 
co-obligor or from his estate if he is deceased.2 Some courts have, there-
fore, required contribution from the estate of a deceased joint tenant 
or tenant by the entirety on the theory that payment of the loan has 
relieved the estate of the deceased from a personal obligation on the 
note.a This result is clearly logical if one considers only the personal 
obligations of the parties, but it ignores the underlying mortgage on 
the land involved. Since the surviving tenant will gain the entire bene-
RICHARD G. HUBER is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and Editor-
in-Chief of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
The author wishes to thank John B. Deady and Paul G. Delaney of the Board of 
Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY for research assistance in preparing this 
chapter. 
Since many security matters are now governed by the Uniform Commercial Code 
and other commercial legislation, readers should consult Chapter 6 for discussion 
of other cases and statutes dealing with security. 
§9.I. 1 See, e.g., the creditor's problems discussed in Huber, Creditors' Rights 
in Tenancies by the Entireties, I B.C. Ind. Be Comm. L. Rev. 197 (1960). 
2 See Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 425 (1959), for a brief discussion of contribution. 
a In re Keil's Estate, 145 A.2d 563 (Del. 1958); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 
Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930); Nobile v. Bartletta, 109 N.J. Eq. 119, 156 Atl. 483 
(19!11); In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951); In re Kershaw's Estate, 
352 Pa. 205, 42 A.2d 538 (1945). 
1
Huber: Chapter 9: Security and Mortgages
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
§9.1 SECURITY AND MORTGAGES 89 
fit of relieving the land from the mortgage, some courts have denied 
contribution from the estate of the deceased tenant.4 This later view 
was adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in the 1927 case of Ratte v. 
Ratte,5 wherein joint tenancies were involved. The Court held that 
the right of contribution depends upon "principles of equity obliging 
those who assume a common burden to bear it in equal proportions." 6 
Since a common obligation no longer existed as to the land, the Court 
decided that to require contribution by the estate of the deceased joint 
tenant would be inequitable. The effect of the note making the joint 
tenants jointly and severally liable on the debt was ignored. 
In Florio v. Greenspan,7 decided during the 1960 SURVEY year, a 
home was bought by a husband and his wife as tenants by the entireties. 
A loan of $20,000, secured by a mortgage on the property, was used as 
part of the purchase price. The husband died shortly after the loan 
was made and the widow continued to make the required monthly pay-
ments, reducing the balance on the note by some $3500 by the time of 
trial. In a declaratory relief action against the administrator of her 
husband's estate she contended that the unpaid balance was an obliga-
tion of the husband's estate or that, at least, his estate was liable for 
one half of the debt remaining at his death.8 The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that this case was controlled by the Ratte case and denied 
relief to the widow. Although a few differences in the incidents of 
joint tenancies and tenancies by the entireties exist, they are not mate-
rial to this dispute, which involves essentially the incident of survivor-
ship, which is common to both estates.9 The Court, while admitting 
that other states have reached opposite conclusions,10 preferred to con-
tinue to follow the Ratte rule. 
The Massachusetts rule satisfies the general policy that a person who 
has received the entire ownership interest in property should bear the 
burdens thereof, but it is not very justifiable theoretically nor, in some 
4 Outside of Massachusetts, this view has been followed in Lopez v. Lopez, 90 
So.2d 456 (Fla. 1956); Durlacher v. First National Bank, 100 So.2d 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1958); In re Dell's Estate, 154 Misc. 216, 276 N.Y. Supp. 960 (Surr. Ct. 1935). 
Cf. In re Staiger's Estate, 1M N.J. Eq. 149, 144 Atl. 619 (1929); Geldart v. Bank of 
New York & Trust Co., 219 App. Div. 581, 205 N.Y. Supp. 238 (2d Dept. 1924). 
5260 Mass. 165, 156 N .E. 870 (1927). 
6260 Mass. at 168, 156 N .E. at 871. 
7340 Mass. 642, 165 N .E.2d 753 (1960). See further discussion of this case in 
§1.7 supra. 
8 The issue in this case as to whether the wife was a mere surety on the husband's 
debt was decided against her below and sustained here as a finding of fact. Other 
questions raised did not have to be answered because of the manner in which the 
Court decided the case, but they involved the widow's right to contribution when 
she had not paid more than a small portion of the debt and her right to bring a 
suit against the husband's estate some years after it was probated. 
9 Massachusetts treats the tenancy by the entirety as essentially a joint tenancy, 
the only major differences in incidents of the two estates being that a tenant by 
the entirety cannot sever the estate and that the husband controls the estate com· 
pletely during the joint lives of the tenants. See Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 50, 99 
N .E. 521 (1912). 
10 It noted the cases cited in note 3 supra. 
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aspects, realistically. Theoretically, at least, the mortgage is merely 
security for the loan and the primary obligation is the personal one on 
the note.H In addition, the Massachusetts rule does not recognize that 
inequalities are inherent in nearly every mortgage situation in which a 
tenancy with right of survivorship is involved; no court has ever held 
that if a husband has paid the entire mortgage debt on a tenancy by the 
entirety immediately prior to his death the wife would be liable to his 
estate for the payment or even one half of it. Yet, as to the sole ques-
tion of benefit to the deceased co-tenant, this hypothetical case is ex-
actly similar to the Ratte and Florio cases. Some unfairness will almost 
certainly occur in any case in which a mortgage is taken on property 
held with right of survivorship if one tenant pays more than his share 
of the debt and then dies. Of course, payment of more than one's share 
during life is a voluntary act, taken with an understanding of the effect 
that the survivorship incident may have, whereas requiring contribu-
tion from the estate of a deceased co-tenant would be an involuntary 
act forced upon the estate of a person who no longer has even the re-
motest of possibilities of gaining the entire estate. If, however, a ten-
ant pays the debt and seeks contribution from the co-tenant, he can 
recover this contribution from the estate of his deceased co-tenant as 
long as the debt was paid prior to the co-tenant's death.12 The Mas-
sachusetts rule does thus give a different rule of contribution depend-
ent upon whether or not the co-tenant survived the payment of the 
debt. 
In two types of fact situations, blind application of the Massachusetts 
rule would result in possible unfairness, even if one concedes that the 
rule is generally equitable. If property has insufficient value to dis-
charge the mortgage, the rule would seem to place the obligation of 
paying any deficiency only upon the surviving tenant, who now has sole 
ownership.13 The Court recognized the existence of this problem in 
its Florio opinion, but did not need to decide it. The solution, how-
ever, may be to find that since the mortgage is now extinguished upon 
foreclosure and sale and the suit for the deficiency is clearly upon the 
note, the personal obligation of the estate of the deceased co-tenant will 
be the same as in any case in which two parties have agreed to be jointly 
and severally liable upon a debt; thus, contribution to the extent of 
one half of the deficiency judgment paid would be granted. 
The second fact situation in which the Massachusetts rule could 
operate inequitably would occur when the money from the loan was 
not used for purchase or improvement of the land but for a private 
enterprise of one co-tenant who then dies;14 here, of course, the Mas-
11 The mortgagee can, of course, unless restricted by statute, enforce his remedies 
concurrently or successively. 3 Jones, Mortgages §1565 (8th ed. 1928). As a matter of 
practice he will almost certainly go against the land in his first action, either jOin-
ing or later bringing a suit for any deficiency. 
12 3 Williston, Contracts §345, p. 771 (3d ed. 1959). 
13 This point has been discussed as an objection to the Massachusetts rule in the 
cases cited in note 3 supra and in Comment, 32 B.U.L. Rev. 253, 255 (1952). 
14 The same problem will exist to a lesser degree when the money is used for 
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sachusetts rule would result in the surviving tenant having to pay the 
mortgage while the deceased co-tenant's estate would have the benefit 
of the funds borrowed. This fact situation is unlikely, however, except 
when the tenants are members of one family and the tenant who did 
not gain any benefit from the loan could be assumed to be willing to 
accept the risk. In a purely business tenancy relationship the party 
gaining no benefit from the loan should be responsible for protecting 
himself. If he fails to do so, the Court may very properly consider that 
he was either willing to assume the risk or that he intended to make a 
gift in this form if events caused him to have to pay back the entire 
loan. 
The rule of the Ratte and Florio cases may well not be the better 
one but it does provide a guide for the solution of estate and business 
problems involving these types of estates. Any untoward effects of the 
rule in any particular fact situation can be avoided by proper estate or 
business planning. One may comment, however, that those states fortu-
nate enough to have abolished through legislation those tenancies with 
right of survivorship need not worry about this problem. 
§9.2. Discharge of mortgage: Mortgagor as executor of mortgagee's 
estate. The rule has been long established in Massachusetts that when 
a debtor is appointed executor or administrator of his creditor's estate, 
the debt is extinguished and is treated as paid and as estate assets in 
hand. The earliest case cited as establishing this proposition in the 
Commonwealth is Stevens v. Gaylord.1 The case, however, held that 
the debt was not extinguished but that the right of action was sus-
pended.2 This distinction was approved in Winship v. Bass3 but seems 
thereafter to have been ignored. The Stevens case also stated that the 
debtor-executor could, in his account, treat the debt as extinguished 
but might not be required to do SO.4 Language in Tarbell v. Parker<> 
also supports the concept that the relationship merely creates prima 
facie evidence of payment, which essentially would suggest that the 
debtor-executor could rebut the finding that his debt was paid. The 
case, however, did give the right of election to a successor administrator, 
which certainly qualifies the original debtor-executor's right. At least 
by the time that Tarbell v. Jewett6 was decided in 1880 the rule was 
fully established that payment occurs by operation of law. 
This rule as to the automatic extinguishment of a debt has been 
applied in varying situations. Bassett v. Fidelity 6- Deposit CO.7 re-
quired the debtor-executor to account for the debt as an asset of his 
a joint enterprise of the two tenants but one in which their respective interests 
vary proportionately from their interests in the land. 
§9.2. 1 11 Mass. 256 (1814). 
2 II Mass. at 266·267. 
312 Mass. 198,202-203 (1815). 
4 II Mass. 256, 266 (1814). 
I) 101 Mass. 165,167-168 (1869). 
6129 Mass. 457, 461-463 (1880). 
7184 Mass. 210, 68 N.E. 205 (1903). 
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creditor's estate despite the fact that prior to the debtor's appointment 
he was insolvent and the right against him worthless. In Choate v. 
Thorndike8 a surety appointed executor of the creditor's estate had the 
debts on which he was surety charged as paid and as estate assets. The 
Court has further held in this surety situation that the delinquent orig-
inal debtor is absolved from liability to the estate.9 The rule has been 
limited consistently, however, by language stating that it would not "be 
allowed to go so far as to work wrong and injustice." 10 Thus, in Kin-
ney v. Ensignll the Court refused to release a mortgage when to do so 
would give a windfall to a subsequent purchaser, indicating that a dis-
tinction can be made between the debt, which was released, and the 
security, which was not. Sigourney v. W etherell 12 held the rule of con-
structive payment unavoidable but, on the question of release of securi-
ties, stated that whether it "would be so far regarded as actual payment, 
as to exonerate a surety, or discharge any other collateral liability, is a 
distinct question . . ." 13 
Barnes v. Lee Savings Bank14 decided during the 1960 SURVEY year, 
applied the extinguishment rule. The plaintiff was the sole legatee 
and executrix of her father's estate. Sometime before his death he had 
transferred property to her and her husband, retaining a bond debt 
secured by a mortgage upon the property. This mortgage was later 
subordinated voluntarily by the decedent to a mortgage loan on this 
and other property given by the defendant bank to the plaintiff and her 
husband. Later, being involved in business difficulties, they gave a 
further mortgage to the defendant bank to compensate it for money 
owed and did not reveal the existence of the father's mortgage. Fore-
closure under the first mortgage left a cash balance in the bank's hands. 
The plaintiff, as executrix, claimed a portion of this money for the 
estate as proceeds to which the second mortgagee was entitled; the 
bank contended that, since the debt secured by the second mortgage 
was treated as fully paid, it was entitled to the balance of the fore-
closure proceeds under its third mortgage. The Supreme Judicial 
Court agreed with the bank, quoting the rule of debt extinguishment, 
and stating that a bond or mortgage securing the now extinguished 
debt was necessarily discharged along with the debt. The "wrong and 
injustice" limitation on this rule did not apply on these facts since the 
decedent apparently had no creditors and the debtor-executrix was 
sole legatee; his estate did not suffer by the application of the rule. 
§9.3. Mortgages: Improvement loan. General Laws, c. 168, §35(10), 
provides that a savings bank may make a loan to the owner of im-
proved real estate upon which it holds a mortgage for repairs and al-
8 138 Mass. 371 (1885). 
9 Hazel v. Valentine, 113 Mass. 472, 479·481 (1873). The debtor was, of course, 
held to be liable to the surety. 
10 Kinney v. Ensign, 18 Pick. 232, 236 (Mass. 1836). 
11 Ibid. 
126 Metc. 553 (Mass. 1842). 
136 Metc. at 558. 
14 340 Mass. 87, 162 N.E.2d 666 (1959). 
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terations to the property.1 Section 28A of G.L., c. 183, requires, in 
part, that, after the recording of the original mortgage, a mortgagee's 
further loan to a mortgagor for repairs, taxes, or assessments is to be 
secured by the original mortgage to the extent that the aggregate bal-
ance of the original and second loans does not exceed "at anyone 
time" the amount of the original loan. Wellfleet Savings Bank v. 
Swift 2 involved the interaction of these two statutory provisions. The 
original owners of property secured a mortage loan for $5300 from the 
plaintiff bank in 1953; in 1955 they borrowed an additional $1000, 
which apparently was a loan under G.L., c. 168, §35(10).3 In 1956 
they sold the property to the defendant herein, "[s]ubject to a first 
mortgage in favor of [the plaintiff]." The defendant was unaware of 
the $1000 loan and refused to pay on the balance, although he paid 
on the original loan balance.4 The plaintiff bank sought permission to 
foreclose the mortgage. The lower court held for the plaintiff bank, 
finding that at no time did the amount outstanding and owed to the 
bank exceed the original amount of the mortgage; this finding is con-
tested, since the only evidence of amounts due is testimony that the 
original loan had been reduced to $3770.52 and the Clause 10 loan to 
$636.19, as of the date of the hearing in this case, which was about 
two and a half years after the defendant had the property conveyed to 
him, and three and a half years after the Clause 10 loan was originally 
made. 
On appeal the defendant contended that the Clause 10 loan is not 
subject to Section 28A and therefore is an unsecured loan made by the 
bank to the original owners of the property. The Court found it un-
necessary to rule on this point,5 since they held that, even if Section 
28A applied, no evidence existed as to the aggregate amount of the 
two loans except at a period well after the Clause 10 loan was origi-
nally made and well after the transfer of the property involved to the 
defendant. Although doubt exists as to the meaning of the Section 
28A clause "at anyone time," which refers to the time of computation 
of the aggregate of original and additional loans, clearly it could refer 
to no time after the conveyance of the property to the defendant. If 
it did apply to a later time, this would subject the grantee to a new 
encumbrance at some time after he acquired the property at a time 
when it was not subject to the encumbrance; his payments would re-
§9.3. 1 The loans are often referred to as Clause 10 loans. The section limits 
these loans to $1500 on anyone parcel of real estate and requires payment within 
five years, or on transfer of the mortgaged premises, or with the payment of the 
mortgage loan balance. 
2340 Mass. 62, 162 N.E.2d 799 (1959). 
3 The Court accepted the lower court's determination on this issue, although there 
had been no finding below as to the purpose of the $1000 loan. 
4 Evidence, and the stipulated facts, indicates that the original owners had paid 
some amounts on the $1000 loan after they sold the property to the defendant. 
Record, p. 5. 
5340 Mass. 62, 65, 162 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1959), the Court noting that it preferred 
not to decide this issue since no brief was filed nor argument made by the plaintiff 
bank. 
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duce the aggregate of the two loans so that they would total less than 
the amount of the original loan and then the additional loan would 
become an encumbrance upon the property, being covered by the 
mortgage given at the time of the original loan. 
§9.4. Legislation. Acts of 1959, c. 505, added new sections to G.L., 
c. 140,1 which are designed to limit interest rates on certain home mort-
gages. These sections apply to loans of more than $1500 secured wholly 
or in part by a mortgage on real estate of three or less households, as-
sessed at no more than $10,000, and occupied in whole or in part by 
the mortgagor. Maximum interest rates are limited to Ii per cent per 
month on the unpaid balance of the loan; further interest limited to I 
per cent per month can be charged when default occurs. The legisla-
tion was enacted to safeguard the rights of small property owners and 
in effect represents an extension of the Small Loan Act.2 Acts of 1960, 
c. 446, amended Section 90A of this new legislation but made no signi-
ficant changes of substance; greater clarity and better style were ob-
tained. The penalty of 1 per cent per month is now clearly indicated 
to apply only to the unpaid balance of the actual loan and not to the 
unpaid regular interest, thus avoiding any compounding of this in-
terest. A sentence permitting the borrower to pay the entire unpaid 
balance without incurring any penalty was added but, since the statu-
tory language permits interest only at the maximum rate, it would 
seem that no penalties could have been charged even under the lan-
guage prior to the amendment. The express statement of the no-
penalty provision will, however, avoid any possible difficulties of 
interpretation, since it lays down a precise and certain rule for the 
guidance of all parties. Borrowers under this act are less likely to 
consult lawyers than are those with more extensive investments. Thus, 
this act and similar protective statutes should spell out rights and 
obligations with maximum clarity so that they can be understood by 
a person inexperienced in interpreting statutory law. 
General Laws, c. 255, §31D, gives a lien to those persons who clean, 
store, or otherwise service clothing and houshold goods. If work is 
done upon the goods by the lienor, or if the storage period is for a 
specified period, the statute provides for a 90-day period after com-
pletion of the work or the end of the agreed storage period, at the end 
of which the lienor can commence action leading to the sale of the 
articles upon which the lien is imposed. The statute has, however, 
specified a period of one year from the date of storage when the storage 
is for an unspecified period before the lienor can commence his action 
to sell the stored articles. Acts of 1960, c. 285, has changed this one 
year period to 120 days. Since, after the end of the period, the lienor 
must give notice to the owner of the clothes or goods, and 30 days are 
§9.4. 1 Sections 90A·90D were added to the chapter. 
2 G.L., c. 140, §§96-114A. This interpretation is supported by the $1500 minimum 
loan, which is the maximum amount under the Small Loan Act, and the limited 
application of this act to those persons who, by lack of business experience and 
strong economic position, might require this protection. 
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allowed the owner to redeem the articles subject to the lien, the shorter 
period works no hardship upon the owner and gives the lienor the 
right to proceed within a reasonable time to recover the value of his 
storage services. 
Acts of 1958, c. 674, added a new Chapter 255B to the General Laws, 
regulating the retail instalment sale of motor vehicles.3 Acts of 1960, 
c. 173, added a new Section 20A to the chapter. The new provision 
requires the holder of the note under a mortgage or conditional sale 
to record on the return day of the foreclosure sale of a repossessed car 
an affidavit signed by the purchaser at the sale stating the price paid 
for the vehicle and the date and place of sale. Failure to comply with 
this recording requirement relieves the maker of the note from lia-
bility for any deficiency. 
3 The act is discussed in detail in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.3. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1960 [1960], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1960/iss1/12
9Huber: Chapter 9: Security and Mortgages
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
